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FOREWORD
Friendly Force Dilemmas in Europe comes at an opportune time. Europe is in a period
of significant transition, and the region faces its greatest security challenges since the end
of the Cold War. The list of challenges is certainly sufficient to make national security
practitioners on both sides of the Atlantic shudder—a revisionist Russia, terrorism, climate change, access to energy, demography and migration, weakening European identify and the rise of nationalism, and a changing information space. Within this precarious
environment, the present monograph assesses the most important and most relevant
shortcomings of security-related intergovernmental organizations in Europe. A range of
potential solutions are offered to foster greater capability and drive a more coherent security response.
The security of the United States and Europe are interdependent. As the 2017 National
Security Strategy reconfirms, a strong and free Europe remains of vital importance to the
United States. Similarly, the 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasizes the critical role
for the United States of its alliances and partners—one area where near-peer competitors
like China and Russia are unable to compete. At the same time, and despite concerns
over burden sharing, United States conventional and strategic forces continue to serve as
the main guarantor of European security. To borrow from United States European Command’s tagline, we are truly “Stronger Together.”
I would be remiss if I did not draw attention to the unique composition of this integrated research team. As part of its core curriculum, the U.S. Army War College encourages broad perspectives, cross-cultural savviness, and constant challenge of any and all
assumptions. In this spirit, the research team comprised academics, U.S. students, and
international students and faculty from Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the
United Kingdom. The end result is analysis that covers an array of transatlantic security
perspectives.
Friendly Force Dilemmas in Europe answers a priority research topic for the Chief of Staff
of the U.S. Army. In some cases, particular shortcomings may seem beyond the impact of
the Army or the Department of Defense (DoD). However, both the Army—through the
role the Chief of Staff of the Army plays on the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and DoD play critically influential roles in shaping U.S. strategy and policy through the interagency. Moreover, both the Army and DoD have an array of policy tools under their direct authority
that could address challenges at the level of intergovernmental institutions. Finally, even
for those issue areas where the Army and DoD cannot shape strategy or wield policy
tools, having awareness of particular institutional hurdles and shortcomings is nonetheless useful and important.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Over the last several years, European security has confronted major new challenges.
Russia’s land grab in Ukraine and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-inspired transnational terrorism are two of the most obvious, but climate change, destabilizing migration,
insufficient energy resources, a weakened European identity, and manipulation of the
information space greatly complicate an already threatening security environment.
Two of the most powerful, most successful intergovernmental security institutions—
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU)—have
each taken steps to ameliorate insecurity in Europe. NATO’s Readiness Action Plan and
the EU’s Action Plan for Military Mobility are just two examples of how the transatlantic
community and the countries of Europe have sought to leverage their collective strength
to achieve security gains for all.
Although these and other initiatives that were undertaken to date have been necessary,
they have nonetheless proven insufficient in mitigating the aforementioned security challenges. This monograph identifies political divisions, a lack of shared threat perceptions,
inadequate resourcing, insufficient capabilities and capacity, tedious decision-making
procedures, insufficient interoperability, an incomplete operational picture, and inadequate maneuverability as the most problematic of the institutional shortcomings that
collectively frustrate the ability of NATO and the EU to meet their security-related goals.
These institutional shortcomings are critically important to the United States, given
how prominently Europe sits within the United States’ vital national security interests.
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy is clear on how a strong and free Europe is vital
to the United States, on how NATO in particular forms one of America’s great advantages over its competitors, and on how a fractured NATO and a weakened EU only benefit U.S. adversaries.
Unfortunately, several of the institutional challenges identified in this monograph
seem stubbornly persistent—for instance, disagreements over adequate resourcing of
NATO are nearly as old as the alliance itself. Moreover, many of these problems might
appear to sit beyond the influence of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) or the U.S.
Army.
Nevertheless, this paper makes a number of recommendations in four broad areas
where DoD and Army engagement can help to overcome the thorny problems identified
in this monograph and thereby drive a more coherent security response from NATO
and the EU. First, the monograph identifies needed improvements in NATO and wider
European capability development, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, the monograph recommends that the United States refocus foreign military sales,
reinforce EU defense consolidation, and build capacity in both the military sphere and in
Europe’s ability to respond to natural and man-made disaster relief operations.
Second, the monograph recognizes the key role that the Chief of Staff of the Army
plays on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, encouraging Army leadership to use its influence to
press for structural and policy changes within NATO. Specifically, this monograph recommends the Army and DoD use their influence in the interagency to address NATO’s
unwieldy decision-making process, foster greater commitment to the NATO Defense
xiii

Planning Process (NDPP), and promote the development of a division of labor strategy
that would reduce duplication of effort between Europe and the United States.
Third, the monograph identifies critical improvements necessary in European infrastructure that would improve mobility and a rapid reinforcement in the event of a crisis in
Europe. Here the United States should continue to pressure European countries toward
implementing the initiatives already put forward in the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) and the extant Readiness Action Plan. Washington should also consider earmarking more European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) funding for infrastructure projects
to improve redundancy and resilience in European transport networks, especially those
that connect ports and airports with pre-positioned stocks.
Fourth, the monograph recommends that Washington consider a number of steps
that would reduce risk, generate a more robust deterrence, and enable greater cohesion
among its European partners. Additionally, the monograph suggests the United States
should reframe the intelligence classification process to emphasize sharing among allies,
station additional forces in Europe to strengthen deterrence, and prepare to unilaterally
deploy forces forward in advance of any decisions made by the North Atlantic Council
(NAC).
Throughout, what sets this monograph apart from other analyses produced for senior
Army and DoD leadership is that it is largely based on the informed assessments, research,
and analysis of America’s allies and partners. The team that authored this monograph
includes military officers from some of America’s closest security and foreign policy partners—Austria, Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The officers that
comprise the research team collectively offer a unique perspective on the topics examined
in this monograph, a perspective from which senior DoD and Army leadership do not
typically hear. Given the importance that the United States has long placed on leveraging
its alliance and partner relationships to address the most pressing security challenges of
the day, it is vital to consider and heed the perspectives of those allies and partners.
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FRIENDLY FORCE DILEMMAS
European integration leading to more strategic independence.
With domestic politics and the security environment providing context at the
state and system levels, intergovernmental
institutions like NATO and the EU find
themselves on shifting ground. Whether
and how they respond to this is critically
important to the United States, given its
vital role in European security today, a
role that is arguably no less important now
than it was during the Cold War. For the
U.S. Army, the effectiveness and efficiency
with which intergovernmental organizations—especially NATO but also the EU—
respond to the new environment matter a
great deal.
This monograph will critically assess
the most important and most relevant
shortcomings of security-related intergovernmental organizations in Europe.
What makes this approach unique from
others that have sought to address similar issues of the last several years is that
it is largely based on the informed assessments, research, and analysis of America’s allies. The team that authored this
monograph includes military officers
from some of America’s closest security
and foreign policy partners—Austria,
Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the
United Kingdom. The officers from these
countries offer experiences, backgrounds,
and expertise that collectively provide a
unique perspective on the topics examined in this monograph. For over a quarter
century, U.S. national security strategies
have emphasized how the United States
prefers to address the major security challenges of the day in coalitions of willing

INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, Europe has witnessed a variety of security crises across
the spectrum of operations from Russia’s
conventional operations in Ukraine to
hybrid war to Islamic State-directed plots
and attacks to domestic “lone wolf” terrorism. In response to these challenges, the
principal intergovernmental organizations
charged with safeguarding European security—the European Union (EU) and North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—
have implemented changes in strategy,
operations, and posture. Despite this, there
is evidence that these same organizations
have struggled to assure member states,
muster sufficient resources, and ameliorate the aforementioned security challenges. These shortcomings have tested
the viability of previously held assumptions and raised questions about the role
and efficacy of collective, intergovernmental instruments.
At the same time, the political environment may be shifting. The Trump
administration has placed nearly singular
emphasis on transatlantic burden-sharing and questioned NATO‘s relevance. In
Europe, Brexit and recent elections in the
Netherlands, France, Germany, and Italy
have had major impacts on the EU’s institutional strength and its military, diplomatic, and foreign assistance capabilities.
All of this adds further complexity to the
political environment facing members of
the transatlantic community. On the other
hand, these factors might be the trigger
for increasing defense efforts of America‘s European allies as well as a deeper
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and capable partners, and more specifically that the United States prefers to do so
with allies and partners from Europe and
North America. For this reason, it is vital
to consider and heed the perspectives of
those allies and partners, if only to ensure
Washington does not succumb to a kind of
beltway myopia.
This monograph first outlines the most
pressing salient aspects of the security
environment confronting the transatlantic community. It will then examine the
major shortcomings of security-related
intergovernmental institutions in managing or eliminating the security challenges.
The monograph will do so with the goal of
identifying critical implications for the U.S.
Army and Department of Defense (DoD),
as well as identifying potential means by
which the U.S. Army and DoD might support and assist U.S. allies and partners in
overcoming the institutional shortcomings to strengthen collective defense and
security.
In some cases, particular shortcomings
of NATO and the EU may seem beyond the
impact of the Army or DoD. However, both
the Army—through the role the Chief of
Staff of the Army plays on the Joint Chiefs
of Staff—and DoD play critically influential roles in shaping U.S. strategy and
policy through the interagency. Moreover,
both the Army and DoD have an array of
policy tools under their direct authority
that could address challenges at the level
of intergovernmental institutions. Finally,
even for those issue areas where the Army
and DoD cannot shape strategy or wield
policy tools, having an awareness of particular institutional hurdles and shortcomings is nonetheless useful and important.

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
According to the NATO Communiqué released after the Warsaw Summit in
2016, the alliance faces today “an increasingly diverse, unpredictable, and demanding security environment,” that provokes
instability.1 This section will identify the
most salient challenges facing the transatlantic community.
The Challenge from Moscow
The most significant military threat
in Europe is that posed by a resurgent
Russia, as evidenced by an array of hostile
military, economic, political, and covert
actions directed against the West over the
last decade, reaching a pinnacle with the
2014 invasion of Ukraine. Russia perceives
NATO enlargement as a threat and engagement with the West as largely futile.2 The
result is open security competition with
the prospect of war, either by design or by
accident, increasing each year.3
Many Russians view the Soviet decision to end the Cold War struggle as altruistic and beneficial to both Russia and the
West, a move that was not appreciated
nor reciprocated by the West. The Kremlin
had wanted Russia to be treated qualitatively different from other non-members of
the NATO alliance in its relations.4 It also
demanded that its relationship should be
one of strategic dialogue, with Russia on
equal footing with the West.5 However,
the initial agreements between NATO
and Russia fell far short of Russian expectations.6 Even the formal agreements to
institutionalize relations between NATO
and Russia sought to limit the influence of
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Russia while maintaining NATO’s freedom of action. In these cases, the strategy
was to provide symbolic equality with no
substance.7
The invitation by NATO to seven applicant states, including the three former
Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia, as well as two Balkan countries
and two central European states, greatly
exacerbated tensions between NATO and
Russia. For the first time in post-Soviet history, the society and the elite saw NATO
as aggressive as it approached Russia’s
borders.8
From the Russian perspective, Moscow
is countering and balancing against a
more powerful, expansive, and aggressive
West.9 This interpretation of present-day
international relations is part of a broader
historical pattern, in which there is a “traditional and instinctive Russian sense of
insecurity,” driving Russia to view other
states as threatening without determining
intent.10 In many ways, this is the same
phenomenon observed over 70 years ago
by U.S. diplomat George Kennan in the
Long Telegram.11 As such, Russia and the
West may be in an unavoidable security
dilemma, one that will require a significant
effort to reverse.

additional people have raised the awareness of the terrorist threat within Europe
to new heights.
That this new awareness of the threat
within Europe coincides with a massive
refugee crisis has led to at least a cursory
linkage between the two stressors on
European stability in much of the public
perception. There have in fact been some
legitimate linkages between these two factors, with at least one of the attackers in
the Paris November 13th attack traveling
on a fake Syrian passport with the refugee
flow into France, with Frontex (the border
agency of the EU) identifying a number
of individuals requesting refugee status
based on false Syrian passports. Although
the actual amount that refugee flows will
contribute to the movement of terrorist
elements is difficult to assess with precision, the conclusion that some radicalized elements will penetrate into Europe
is a surety. Additionally, personnel who
have fought in Syria or Iraq who return
to Europe will continue to pose a terror
threat.12 Arguably, a significant proportion
of the refugee population is unlikely to be
radicalized, and many are well-educated
professionals from Syria who fled after the
Islamic State created an authoritarian proto-state. The results in the public perception though are colored by the few who are
linked to terrorism.13
European states have identified a lack
of assimilation of some in the Muslim communities found within Europe as a potential path toward radicalism. Countries in
Europe have adopted different approaches
to increase assimilation, with mixed success. Some have tried to force assimilation,
while others have attempted a soft power
approach to encourage assimilation.14

Terrorism
In the past several years, a string of
attacks has brought terrorism to the forefront of the European mindset. The attack
on the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris on
January 7, 2015; the complex series of
attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, that
killed 130 people and wounded hundreds
more; and the attacks in Brussels on March
22, 2016, that killed 33 people (including
the 3 attackers) and wounded over 300
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However, in the wake of the recent
terrorist attacks, some European governments have turned from the more inclusive
liberal approach to Muslim immigrants
and have begun to adopt more hard power
approaches to counterterrorism within
their own territory. Following the Charlie
Hebdo attack in 2015, France added nearly
2,700 personnel to its military and intelligence agencies, and later the parliament
authorized wiretapping without a judge’s
ruling. France is not alone, with similar
approaches taking place across Europe to
counter the increased terrorist threat.15

Europe acknowledged the effects of climate change on international security in
a report to the European Council nearly a
decade ago.19 Compared to global trends,
the foreseeable effects of climate change
on Europe itself remain limited, though
Europe’s Mediterranean region will face
large increases in heat extremes resulting
in droughts, forest fires, and loss of crop
yields.
An increase in natural disasters will be
the most direct effect on European security.
European countries differ, but they generally maintain a wide array of capabilities
to manage and mitigate natural disasters.
Although Europe may not feel significant direct effects of climate change,
regions nearby most certainly will. For
example, the Maghreb, Sub-Saharan
Africa, the Near and Middle East, as well
as Central Asia, will all be affected by
decreasing water sources and food scarcity. Rudimentary infrastructure, local
conflicts, and weak governance will prevent effective redistribution of food and
water. Given the proximity and relative
stability of Europe, mass migration from
each of these regions is likely, resulting
in potentially destabilizing political, economic, and even diplomatic outcomes.

Climate Change
Terrorism and the Russian threat to
European and transatlantic security are
obvious and acute. However, there are
other significant threats to European security that will also impact American interests, some in the short run, but many in the
medium and long terms. Foremost among
these from Europe’s perspective is the
threat of climate change. European governments, as well as U.S. agencies, agree
that there is unambiguous scientific data
to establish a long-term warming trend
in global temperatures. Over the coming
decades, climate change will become more
noticeable as temperature and precipitation extremes become more common,16
resulting in rising sea levels, increased risk
of coastal flooding, increased droughts,
heatwaves, and land degradation.17
Decreasing ice coverage of the Arctic sea,
increased accessibility, and the resulting opportunities for trade and resource
exploitation of permafrost areas will lead
to an increasing strategic importance of
the region.18

Access to Energy Trade
With a projected population of about
9 billion people and an average rate of 3.4
percent growth of the global economy,
current studies expect an increase of global
energy demand of 30 percent until 2040.
Most of this new demand will come from
India and developing South-East Asian
countries. Liquefied natural gas (LNG)
is projected to supply 90 percent of the
growth in long-distance gas trade. Russia’s
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dependence on energy based revenues, an
increasingly interconnected energy network in Europe as well as the rise of the
United States as an exporter for oil and
LNG will decrease the potential of Russia
to use energy supply as a coercive tool.
However, other energy trade-related
challenges will arise. For example, transportation of LNG deemphasizes the importance of pipelines in favor of large-scale
LNG terminals and transport on the sea
as well as inland waterways.20 This, combined with the increased local availability
of efficient renewable energy sources, will
decrease the global importance of individual energy sources while increasing
the importance of the maritime transport
routes through the global commons.
A more highly interdependent European energy network comes at the price
of increased vulnerability of the system
to cyber threats. The 2015 attack on the
Ukrainian power grid that resulted in a
power outage for 80,000 customers was
one of several incidents that have already
proven the potential of catastrophic
impacts on the energy security.21 Threats
can affect the generation, transmission,
and distribution of energy, process technologies, confidential strategic energy
infrastructure data, as well as energy
market services.22 Cyber risks concerning
the energy sector have an especially high
potential to cross into the physical domain,
as disruptions will affect supply chains,
individual households, and could cause
additional environmental effects through
attacks on oil and nuclear infrastructure.

conditions are the most important “push”factors.23 More specifically, conflict is the
strongest incentive for migration. International wars—including national wars
fought with foreign military intervention—trigger more migration than civil
wars without foreign involvement. Human
rights violations cause fewer movements
than physical conflict, and ethnic rebellions usually result in bigger internal refugee movements, whereas population
movement remains low.24
Actual and expected wage differentials
and differences in living standards are
the most important economic incentives.25
Analyzed in conjunction with the skilllevel of migrants, employment opportunities in the destination country are triggers
of deliberate migration.26 These considerations largely explain EU internal migration from Central and Eastern Europe to
the west and, to a lesser extent, from South
to North-West European countries.
Migration causes second and third
order effects on security. Examples include
the perceived relationship between immigration and terrorism, fueling nationalistic
populism with negative ramifications for
collective security. A situation of mutual
fear can accompany high levels of migration, which promotes a chain of self-protective actions and reactions between the
native population and foreigners, ultimately leading to a threat to national
security, and even conflict.27 Uncontrolled
immigration in 2015 had only moderate
effects, but further migrant inflow could
finally reach the important level of 10 percent foreigners among overall domestic
populations, which research suggests is
a critical threshold for increased tensions
between migrants and the extant domestic
population.28

Demographic Hurdles
Although environmental trends may
push more migrants toward Europe,
domestic political and socio-economic

5

Eastern European countries—which
have been particularly hostile to migrant
flows from outside of Europe—will see a
considerable population decrease until
2050. In Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Republic of Moldova,
Romania, Serbia, and Ukraine, the total
population decrease will likely exceed 15
percent.29 A decrease of ethnic Latvians
while ethnic-Russian population levels
remain stagnant could lead to increased
Russian influence based on a higher share
in the overall population.30 Finally, the
population decrease through net emigration is nothing less than a threat to the
viability of smaller states like Latvia or
Lithuania. 31

forces the commonality of interests
that modern Europe represents. This European common identity is hampered by a
growing Euroscepticism and a return to
previous national identities as a shelter
against some of the more negative consequences of the 2008 economic crisis and
increased immigration.
Eventually, the existence of a common
European identity with associated common
interests and threat perceptions may benefit transatlantic solidarity, simplify collective decision-making, and make building
and sustaining interoperability easier.
For now, though, the momentum toward
a common European identity is still too
weak to undergird a unified European
security and defense policy and strategy
effectively.

Weakened European Identity
The history of Europe has been a continuous clash of identities. The continent
has been subject to periodic and frequently
violent migrations, as well as a seemingly permanent struggle for hegemony
among the different European nations.
The final outcome of such a history has
been a plethora of national identities. All
large European countries are the result of
a union, by will or force, of different historical communities. In some cases, one of
those communities maintained a situation
of real or perceived political and economic
privileges to the detriment of the rest.
This was the situation of England in the
United Kingdom, Castile in Spain, or the
Walloon community in Belgium. Ethnicity
and religion also play a role as instruments
wielded by nationalist leaders to incite tension and conflict, especially in regions like
the Balkans.
European collective identity, symbolized most obviously by the EU, rein-

A Changing Information Space
European societies are fully immersed
in the information age, which presents
both opportunities and vulnerabilities.
European citizens have easy access to
ideologically diverse press and media.
The level of education suggests an intellectually sophisticated population, capable of using critical thinking to evaluate
the information products they constantly
receive. Theoretically, European citizens
should not be especially vulnerable to disinformation, but actually, there are several
indicators showing a different reality.
In 2014, 80 percent of European citizens
used the internet every day and 30 percent
had access through a broadband connection. This amount is less than other developed countries such as the United States
(87 and 31 percent, respectively) or Japan
(91 and 30 percent), but still much higher
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than most developing countries like China
(49 and 14 percent).32
Europeans also enjoy excellent access
to print, online, and television journalism.
For instance, half of the EU countries have
access to more than 400 television channels, while the typical consumer has access
to an average of 127 on-demand audiovisual media services.33 In many European
countries, television is considered a public
service, and there are many state-broadcasted television (TV) channels.
However, the tendency toward concentration and the creation of “global media
empires” has been a decrease in the quality
and reliability of the information received
by the average European citizen. The main
two foreign sources of disinformation and
manipulation of information in Europe
over the last decade have been the Russian
Federation and the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL).
Russia’s original main tool for strategic communication was Russia Today
(RT) TV channel, initially conceived as a
vehicle for Russian promotion abroad.34
Currently, RT includes seven different
channels broadcasting in English, Arabic,
and Spanish from Moscow, Washington,
and London. From its initial goal of praising and promoting Russia in foreign countries, the channel has evolved toward a
more aggressive tone, especially after the
crisis in Ukraine in 2014, highlighting negative aspects of European societies, culture, and politics.
Just after the crisis in Ukraine, Moscow
launched a new communication tool,
Sputnik News, a complex network of sites
that intends to broadcast in 30 languages.
Russia also owns a diversity of websites
and news agencies all around the world.
It has even established partnerships with
Western media outlets.

Probably the best-known Russian
instrument for disinformation is the
cyber networks apparently composed of
thousands of automated accounts (bots)
and human operators. This network contributes to the disinformation campaign
launched from channels that are more conventional, and carries out operations that
are more offensive like hacking e-mails,
phones, stealing data, or blocking web
pages and databases.35
Russian offensive cyber capabilities are
well known since the crippling cyberattacks against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in
2008. Currently, Moscow combines a more
sophisticated mixture of complementary
and mutually reinforcing cyber and disinformation campaigns. The main targets
are the former Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and countries under the Soviet
umbrella during the Cold War. The central
message is to show how Western societies
are aggressive, decadent, and on the verge
of collapse, as the Soviet Union was in the
1980s.36
ISIL disinformation campaigns primarily target Muslim communities around
the world, and the primary objective of
its strategic communication campaigns
is recruitment and support for its cause.
Social networks are the main communication tool for ISIL, although they also use
tools like web pages, magazines, declarations, and even printed publications that
are more traditional.
The success of Russian and ISIL strategic communications in Europe is difficult to
evaluate. Russia’s image in Europe has not
improved and, even if the campaign has
been more successful in Eastern Europe,
the impact on governance and political
decisions has been limited. It is more likely
that Russian disinformation has achieved
more success internally in Russia than
7

externally in Europe. However, even if the
rise of radical parties and the deterioration
of the EU’s image are more the results of
the economic crisis than Russian disinformation, Moscow also had some influence
on it.
ISIL’s information campaigns have
obtained moderate success recruiting
fighters in Europe and inspiring terrorist
attacks. The number of attacks has been
limited, even if some of them were quite
costly in human lives. Public alarm after
the attacks has been considerable, but still
has not attracted a significant number of
Muslim militants in Europe, nor provoked
widespread violence against Muslim communities living in European countries.
European institutions are not well
suited to combat information wars. In
European democracies, the principles of
freedom of opinion and expression make
it difficult to react against messages that
are often considered as covered by those
rights. Additionally, the virulence and
sophistication of some disinformation
campaigns have been a surprise.
The EU External Action established
the East Stratcomm Taskforce in 2015,
specifically aimed to counter Russia disinformation and propaganda. NATO has
two Centers of Excellence (CoE) working
on doctrine and procedures against hostile cyber and information actions: the
Cyberdefense CoE in Tallinn and the Strategic Communications CoE in Riga.

most important of these from a security
perspective is NATO, largely because it
links the United States and Canada with
Europe. The EU has also come to play an
increasingly important role in security,
not least because its governing documents
include a mutual assistance clause similar
to the NATO treaty’s Article 5.
These intergovernmental institutions
help to ameliorate the security dilemma,
lessen the security burden on individual
countries, and facilitate more efficient and
more effective collective action. NATO
and the EU face challenges in adapting
to the evolving security environment and
dealing effectively and efficiently with the
security threats outlined above. This section will examine in greater detail the most
significant of these hurdles.
Political Divisions within the EU
The EU has long had a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), but disagreements among member states limit
its effectiveness to relatively small, shortlived, and low-intensity crisis management missions outside Europe. The CSDP
currently suffers from a lack of commitment and a lack of resources, with its scope
shifting increasingly toward border monitoring and training activities.
Although the EU’s strategy recognizes
NATO’s relevance for collective defense, it
nonetheless makes clear that the “EU needs
to be strengthened as a security community” to enable the EU to act more autonomously when necessary.37 This implies a
division of labor that could realize Washington’s current goals of maximum influence under minimum force presence.
However, most EU military efforts have

INSTITUTIONS TO THE RESCUE?
The countries of Europe and North
America have developed an array of institutional arrangements to cope with problems that are too large or too complex for
any single country to handle alone. The
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been focused on international security
beyond the EU’s borders.
Among EU members, there has been a
critical mass eager to press the accelerator
on European security and defense. Other
member states, while keen on security and
defense in general, want to ensure the EU’s
approach to security and defense in no way
challenges NATO’s supremacy on collective defense, in order to avoid duplication
of effort and the wasting of resources. Still,
other EU member states, particularly those
that are not members of NATO, are uneasy
about excessive deference paid to NATO’s
prerogatives.

Similarly, Lithuania’s National Security
Strategy of 2017 clearly states, “the main
threat for the security of the Republic of
Lithuania is posed by aggressive actions of
the Russian Federation violating the security architecture based on universal rules
and principles of international law and
peaceful co-existence.”39 Norway—who
also shares a border with Russia—recognizes that Russia has increased its capabilities in the north in order to become more
coordinated, flexible, and mobile.40
The threat perceptions of the more
dominant European states vary more significantly in terms of focus. The 2016 White
Paper on Germany’s defense describes
Russia as challenging the European order
by use of force, rejecting a partnership
with the West, and trying to establish itself
as an alternate power. However, Germany’s threat perception is equally balanced between extremist terrorism and
the potential threat posed by Russia.41
Meanwhile, in Italy’s 2015 White Book for
National Defense, the clear focus is on the
instability in the south with the rise of terrorism and domestic political instability in
the Middle East and North Africa.42 This
view is shared by officials in both France
and Portugal.43

Lack of Shared Threat Perceptions
A study of NATO’s Communiqué
from the 2016 Summit clearly indicates
a common threat picture that is comprehensive and touches on all of the potential
threats that NATO nations must confront
or at least consider. However, NATO’s process is consensus-driven, and all member
nations have a part in drafting the communiqué. Ultimately, the text of the communiqué is written to the lowest common
agreed upon language and contains every
interest of importance across the range of
member states.
A European state’s geographic location
is the primary—but not the only—driver
of threat perception. The closer a state is
situated to Moscow, the more prominently
Russia figures into national threat perceptions. Latvia has some of the most forceful
language of all the allies within its National
Security Concept of 2015, stating, “the
aggression in Ukraine fuelled by the Russian Federation has been an unprecedented
attack on the basic principles of the international rights since the end of WWII.”38

Inadequate Decision-Making Capability
NATO enlargement has added complexity to the alliance’s organizational
and bureaucratic processes. Political
decision-making remains state and consensus-based, which ultimately affects
whether and how the alliance responds to
crises.
NATO’s
decision-making
culture
has not evolved sufficiently to meet the
demands of conventional deterrence in
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the contemporary security environment.
As Russia’s Ukraine operation highlights,
security challenges arise and evolve rapidly, and time is therefore of the essence.
While NATO has taken measures to
improve its ability to react in a time of
crisis with high readiness joint forces,
these elements require a unanimous vote
of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). As
it presently stands, the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe’s standing authorities over NATO’s Very High Readiness
Joint Task Force (VJTF) extend only to
staging and preparation.44 While a culture of consensus is a strength for overall
NATO cohesion, the time required to seek
political consensus does not correlate well
to a fast-moving security crisis.

The threat of a resurgent Russia
appears—at least on the surface—to have
galvanized many European nations into
action with promises at the NATO Summit
in 2014 to reverse the downward trend
and meet spending commitments by 2024.
It remains unclear though whether the
largest, most capable allies—especially
Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
and Italy—will find or continue to have
the wherewithal to realize these goals
and hence enable allied operations across
Europe and beyond.
Limited Capacity
While the drive to improve military
mobility must be sustained, attention must
now turn to the underlying issue of NATO
mobilization and defense planning. If the
ability to move is critical to conventional
deterrence, it only follows that NATO
must have sufficient numbers of troops to
move and enough transportation assets to
move them. Moreover, all alliance forces
must be prepared to conduct operations
once they arrive in the theater of operations. Anything less detracts from credible
deterrence and risks strategic instability.
NATO’s current posture relies too
much upon the VJTF alone being able to
achieve the desired effect of deterring
Russian aggression and opportunism.
Assuming the VJTF deploys, it is still only
a brigade, albeit joint and well enabled.
While a multi-national brigade is a useful
tool to signal alliance resolve, it does not
have the combat power to deter decisive
Russian aggression nor can it deter across
a wide frontage.48 The focus, therefore,
should turn to NATO’s follow-on forces in
order to reinforce the deterrent effect.

Lack of Consistently Strong Resourcing
Debates over the resourcing of collective defense are nearly as old as the alliance itself. The collapse of the Soviet Union
and the subsequent drive by many European countries to secure a peace dividend
led to a broad-based reduction in capabilities and capacity during the 1990s.45 Since
2008, the global financial crisis, burgeoning levels of public debt, internal domestic fiscal challenges, recession, and slow
growth have all led to further downward
pressure on European budgets.46 The inevitable result has been a general decline
in defense spending across the alliance
with only a handful of members meeting
goals for overall spending and acquisition
spending. Recently, some Americans have
accused NATO of being a one-sided relationship where the United States absorbs
much of the cost while their European
allies derive all the benefits.47
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As presently envisioned, NATO’s
next tier of readiness forces—the Initial
Follow-on Forces Group of the NATO
Response Force (NRF)—largely comprises
light forces that probably require 30-45
days to deploy.49
Recently, NATO members agreed to
establish two NATO Commands in the
U.S. and in Europe (Germany) to improve
logistic support and strategic mobility in
Europe. It has yet to be seen how effective
these two commands in the NATO Force
Structure will be at supporting movements
from North America to Europe, as well as
in Europe to the east and to the south.

terrorism, at the expense of conventional
capabilities.50 With inertia and impasse
plaguing the alliance, the deterrence posture has leaned toward training and military exercises rather than investing in
major capability programs.
The EU recently breathed life into an
initiative known as Permanent Structured
Cooperation (PESCO). This initiative
should more easily enable EU member
states to jointly develop military capabilities, invest in shared projects, and enhance
their respective armed forces. EU officials have identified 17 joint projects, but
it remains to be seen whether they can
overcome domestic political imperatives
to protect defense manufacturing and the
jobs that come with them.51

Lack of Capabilities
Securing sufficient funding for defense
is only half of the problem. Money alone
will not ensure capability development,
interoperability, and integration. These
problems have increased in complexity
as NATO has expanded from 12 original
members to 29.
There have been a number of attempts
in the last few decades to overcome the
capability gaps between the various
NATO members, including the Defense
Capabilities Initiative of 1999, the Prague
Capabilities Commitment of 2002, the
Smart Defence initiative of 2012, and the
Framework Nations concept of 2014. None
of these initiatives has been particularly
successful in overcoming the significant
national sovereignty and budgetary challenges, or in enabling European allies to
keep pace with an American military that
seems to be perpetually reinventing or
transforming itself with advanced technology or new concepts. Some countries that
are investing in new programs focus on
capabilities to counter hybrid threats and

Insufficient Interoperability
NATO’s posture today places interoperability at center stage. During the Cold
War, the alliance’s defensive plans divided
the inner-German border into nine NATO
Corps operating areas, limiting the need
for interoperability, except for minor coordination across corps boundaries. However, given NATO’s new strategic depth,
the downsizing of most member states’
military forces, and the lack of a coherent defensive plan, the alliance requires a
higher level of interoperability.
Interoperability requirements increasingly include civilian-military shared
domains and resources. Examples include
technical limitations of the Trans-European Transportation Network, required
procedures, and standards for the future
integration of remotely piloted aerial systems in the “Single European Sky” air
traffic management, or—pending results
of ongoing negotiations—mutual access
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to encrypted global navigation satellite
systems for increased performance and
resilience.

threat and subsequent timely decisions
to act against that threat will matter little
if forces cannot move quickly and easily
across national boundaries.55 To its credit,
the European Commission recognizes
these challenges and pledges to develop
a military mobility action plan by March
2018.56 Similarly, NATO’s recent decision
to create a support command focused on
logistics and military movement is also a
promising development.57 Nonetheless,
military capability and capacity gaps still
exist among NATO and EU member states
in terms of planning, executing, and monitoring military transports in and around
the European theater.58

Incomplete Operational Picture
The divergence in threat perception
that exists across the alliance can manifest
itself in the inability of NATO to recognize
gathering storm clouds. Volatility and
unpredictability in the European theater
place a newfound emphasis on continuous strategic awareness, enhanced indicator and warning capability, and the rapid
sharing of intelligence between allies.
U.S. Army Europe has a supporting role to play in aiding the alliance to
improve its speed of recognition, although
U.S. rules and culture on information sharing remains a barrier.52 Of greater concern
for the United States regarding the speed
of recognition is that its NATO allies do
not agree on the nature or extent of the
threat posed by Russia.53

ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS
These challenges represent a complex
array of issues that the transatlantic community must address together in order to
better position itself vis-à-vis Russia and
other security challenges. From the perspective of the U.S. DoD or the U.S. Army,
not all of these challenges may appear
readily or easily solved. Nonetheless, there
are a number of steps the U.S. Army and
DoD can take to enable a more coherent
response on the part of NATO and the EU
to better promote Western interests.

Inadequate Maneuverability
Managing one of the most densely
inhabited regions on the globe with a
correspondingly high volume of traffic,
Europe’s comprehensive transport policy
seeks to establish a competitive, safe,
secure, and sustainable transportation
system. However, the strong policy-focus
on civilian user groups does not necessarily reflect military requirements, thus
preventing the military from taking full
advantage of the existing transportation
network.
The ability to move and deliver forces
and effects to a crisis area is a key dimension of successful conventional deterrence.54 Quick, accurate recognition of a

Refocus Security Cooperation and
Weapons Sales
Security cooperation and foreign military sales can bolster the capability and
capacity of in-place forces in Central and
Eastern Europe. These measures should
include both traditional conventional
capabilities (such as anti-armor and air
defense) as well as tailored capabilities to
counter Russia’s hybrid means that fall
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below the threshold of armed conflict.59
Security cooperation and capacity building are certainly critical in the Baltic States
and Poland.
Additionally, U.S. Army units stationed in or on deployment to Europe can
help build capacity within Headquarters
Multinational Corps Northeast, located in
Szczecin, Poland. This headquarters needs
assistance augmenting its knowledge and
experience as its aperture expands beyond
VJTF scenarios to more comprehensive
and integrated collective defense contingencies across the breadth of NATO’s eastern front.

man-made disasters than NATO. Therefore, the EU is the actor of choice to develop
further disaster relief capacities in a European framework. NATO’s role will be to
support efforts in Europe and its periphery with military means.
U.S. military forces in Europe can support EU and NATO capabilities by addressing specific shortfalls such as tactical and
operational air-mobility. The United States
can more effectively facilitate these kinds
of support by creating a liaison capacity to
the ERCC.

Strengthen EU and NATO Capacity for
Disaster Relief

The Defense Department should use its
influence in the U.S. interagency to advocate for NATO to adopt different voting
procedures for certain issues. Modifications the EU has made to its voting procedures may provide a useful model. When
the EU Council votes on certain proposals
of the Commission or the High Representative, it does so under a qualified majority
voting, instead of seeking consensus.63 This
new voting model means that certain decisions now only require the approval of 55
percent of EU member states, which must
represent at least 65 percent of the EU’s
total population. Qualified majority voting
has helped the EU to overcome some gridlock and to move beyond proposals of limited ambition.64
It is important to note that qualified
majority voting is not applied to all issues
confronting the EU—for instance, decisions regarding the CSDP still require
consensus. Nonetheless, the EU’s modified voting procedures may provide
a useful starting point for discussions
among NATO allies on modifying consensus-based decision-making.

Streamline NATO Decision-Making

In 1998, NATO created the small
Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre within NATO’s headquar
ters. Two years later the EU created its
own center, which in 2013 grew into the
Emergency Response Coordination Center
(ERCC).60 Besides the EU member states,
6 further European countries are part of
the program, which is able to draw upon a
voluntary pool of 90 capacities.61
In November 2017, the EU announced
plans to invest an additional 280 million
Euros to establish a dedicated reserve of
operational capacities and to strengthen
preparedness and prevention measures.62
Unlike NATO’s non-standing Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit, the EU aims to
develop permanent, dedicated, high-readiness forces at its level to bolster national
capabilities.
The EU’s pool of civil and military
capabilities encompasses a wider range
of response options to natural- and
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either could be part of a calibrated U.S.
force posture in Europe or exclusively
provided by NATO Europe for all NATO
forces. Certain areas such as drone operations in controlled airspace will require
comparable standards. Finally, a smart
combination of diverse resources, such
as combining Navstar-Global Positioning
System (GPS) and Galileo in a multi-global
navigation satellite system, could increase
performance and resiliency.
Of course, the major impediment to
increased cooperation between the EU and
NATO—including negotiation of a greater
division of labor—is the Cyprus-Turkey
issue.67 Turkey leverages its membership in NATO—which does not include
Cyprus—to prevent Cyprus from joining the alliance’s Partnership for Peace,
which subsequently prevents increased
cooperation between NATO and the EU.
Ankara does this as a means of reminding
Europe that it must solve the challenge of
a divided Cyprus. Until this issue is overcome, any more significant cooperation
between NATO and the EU is unlikely.

Critics might argue that if NATO
moved away from consensus procedures,
it would place the organization’s interests
above those of its members. However,
changes in voting procedures are absolutely vital if the alliance hopes to retain
any semblance of efficiency and effectiveness, and it could therefore implement initiatives that otherwise might be opposed
by a single ally.
Encourage a Division of Labor between
NATO and EU
The DoD should push the U.S. interagency toward encouraging greater
cooperation between NATO and the EU,
especially in the form of a division-of-labor strategy that would benefit both sides
of the Atlantic and avoid duplication
of effort.65 A properly coordinated division-of-labor could even solve the problem
dual members currently have of having
to contribute to both organizations in a
zero-sum game.66 The EU could assume
the management of small-scale operations
focused on the threats along its near borders. This would allow the EU to use its
leverage as an economic institution with
its neighbors. It would also enable NATO
to focus its main effort on deterrence in the
east. However, in the foreseeable future
European allies will not be able to conduct
major military operations like Operation
Unified Protector or Operation Inherent Resolve without U.S. support. More
effective coordination of EU and NATO is
essential to successfully face the challenges
in the south and the east.
A division of labor could also include
theater-specific services and enablers that

Station Additional Forces in Eastern
Europe
Through the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), U.S. forces in Europe will
soon total four brigade combat teams, one
of them airborne, with the equipment for
an additional fifth team pre-positioned.68
However, to ensure timely deployment,
until the infrastructure is updated in
Europe, the U.S. Army ought to shift more
of its forward presence to Poland and the
Baltic States.69
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requires redundant and resilient transportation networks that connect airports and
seaports and Army pre-positioned stock-2
locations (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands) with Central and Eastern European
states. Any short-term reduction in presence or exercise tempo caused by devoting
more EDI funds to infrastructure is ultimately offset by the longer-term contribution to credible conventional deterrence.

Develop Additional Infrastructure in
Europe
The EU currently has a military mobility initiative, but it may not necessarily
deliver the infrastructure priorities desired
by the United States. Moreover, most projects in that initiative, if approved and
adequately resourced, are not likely to be
completed before 2025.
As with the EU’s infrastructure initiative, the U.S. Army should also be concerned with NATO’s capacity to improve
existing infrastructure and develop new
capabilities through the NATO Security
Investment Program (NSIP).70 The United
States has input into the NSIP at several
levels, and ultimately no NATO infrastructure project is approved without U.S.
agreement (and funding). The flipside,
however, is that NSIP budget decisions
also require the agreement of all 29 NATO
allies. Just to implement NATO’s extant
2014 Readiness Action Plan as well as new
capability packages for air basing (air-toair refueling and bulk fuel installations) is
expected to cost NATO $200 to $300 million per year for the next several years.71
NATO’s limited resources and the need
for a 360-degree approach to security for
both practical and political reasons mean
that Army priorities face stiff competition.
While the EU and NATO continue to
shoulder some of the defense infrastructure burdens, the United States should
do more on its own. Out of the $4.8 billion allocated to EDI for 2018, only $337.8
million is earmarked for infrastructure
improvements like airfields.72 EDI infrastructure spending should be expanded to
address more of the most significant infrastructure priorities. Based on the threat
and anticipated tasks, U.S. Army Europe

Plan for Early Deployment
As a hedge against a lag in NATO
decision-making as well as the inability of
European allies to share the same threat
perceptions, the U.S. Army must prepare
to deploy its assigned and rotational forces
to vulnerable allied countries before NAC
consensus.73 However, it is important to
note that this posture places a significant
staff demand, not currently resourced on
Army command structure in Europe. In
addition to restoring more robust staffing of U.S. Army command structure in
Europe, a full complement of high-quality
multi-national liaison officers will help to
facilitate bilateral deployments in advance
of any delayed NATO decision-making.
Add Teeth to the Defense Planning
Process
For the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) to be effective, it needs to
evolve from identifying and promoting
to identifying and assigning capabilities
through a carefully selected set of incentives and disincentives.74 The U.S. DoD
should use its influence to develop and
encourage the adoption of limited but
impactful incentives for NATO member
states to comply with the NDPP outcomes
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as well as disincentives for member states
to deviate from the NDPP. This will not be
an easy task for it may imply that members lose a certain amount of national
sovereignty in relation to defense issues.
However, a more robust NDPP would
help to ensure that the alliance has available the capabilities that it actually needs,
not simply those developed for reasons of
prestige, tradition, or inertia.
Incentives might include awarding
general and flag officer billets in NATO
command positions or awarding NATO
summits to those countries that are achieving their targets. Disincentives might
include naming and shaming of those allies
that are not accepting or meeting their
capability targets. The alliance does this
to some degree already through annual
release of defense spending figures, but
those figures do not identify which countries are accepting and meeting their capability targets and which are not.

classification as a process designed to promote and facilitate the sharing of information with allies will help NATO and the
EU to overcome problems associated with
recognizing when a crisis is unfolding.
Promote the Right PESCO
To ensure that PESCO fulfills its objective of building European capabilities
while also strengthening collective defense
and deterrence in Europe and beyond,
the United States should support projects
such as the European Medium Altitude
Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft
System, which could be integrated within
the U.S. Global Hawk system. Moreover,
the United States should promote the
development of strategic enablers such as
Special Forces, airlift, helicopters, naval
assets, and others capabilities beneficial to
future EU and NATO task forces.
CONCLUSION

Reframe the Classification Process

Europe is facing a number of complex,
concurrent challenges. A resurgent Russia
is attempting to counter-balance the perceived threat of an expanded NATO by
conducting largely low-risk spoiling operations in the gray zone just below the
threshold that might provoke an Article
5 response from NATO. Russia has ruthlessly exploited opportunities presented
by the rapidly developing cyber and information spaces to undermine democratic
elections, spread propaganda, intimidate
its former allies, and threaten the vulnerable web of European national infrastructure. As NATO grapples with these
challenges, the long-running tensions over
burden sharing continue to create internal
fissures in the trans-Atlantic relationship.

Much of the challenge in getting all
allies to perceive threats similarly has to
do with the inability to share intelligence
adequately. Recent research shows that
shared threat perceptions among elites and
decision-makers are an important variable
in explaining recent increases in NATO
member state defense spending.75 For this
reason, the U.S. military should reframe
the intelligence classification process by
emphasizing first the sharing of information with allies. At present, there is little
incentive to declassify information to the
lowest level, and so U.S. military security
classifications have limiting effects upon
allies’ ability to perceive threats and often
to operate together. Reframing intelligence
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The threat posed by Islamic terrorist
organizations, or “lone wolf” attacks by
homegrown radicalized individuals, dominates the internal security agenda in many
European countries. This threat has been
exacerbated by the challenge of absorbing the mass migration of people from
the Middle East and North Africa fleeing
war, famine, and poverty. In its wake has
followed a continuing political shift away
from the center to more radical nationalist
movements, and a concomitant weakening
of European identity. It is a challenge that
may only increase as the long-term effects
of climate change—and the ongoing instability in Europe’s “near-abroad”—continues to drive large numbers of migrants
toward the relative safety of Europe.
The European security institutions of
NATO and the EU face a myriad of challenges that have plagued them since the
end of the Cold War. The enlargement of
NATO has led to problems with timely
decision-making, and there is little consensus over the priority of the threats facing
Europe. There is the ongoing dilemma
over the EU’s role in European security
and defense, and how it might affect the
balance of resources and capabilities also
assigned to NATO. There continues to be
a lack of political will to resource defense
despite a string of initiatives designed to
improve interoperability, reduce the growing capability gap between the United
States and its allies, and address some of
the major capability shortfalls. Europe
and the United States cannot avoid dealing with these fundamental problems for
much longer.
Many of these seemingly interminable problems sit outside the influence of

the DoD or the U.S. Army. Nevertheless,
this paper has identified a number of recommendations in four broad areas where
DoD and U.S. Army engagement can
help to build greater capability and drive
a more coherent security response from
NATO and the EU.
First, we have identified much-needed
improvements in NATO and wider European capability development, particularly
in Central and Eastern Europe. The United
States could refocus its efforts in terms of
foreign military sales, lending rhetorical
and other forms of support to PESCO, and
strengthening capacity building in both
the military sphere and in Europe’s ability to respond to natural and man-made
disaster relief operations.
Second, there are opportunities for the
DoD to use its influence to press for structural and policy changes within NATO.
These efforts should focus on NATO’s
unwieldy decision-making process; on
developing initiatives to encourage NATO
members to comply with the NDPP; and
on encouraging a division of labor strategy
that would reduce the duplication of effort
from both within Europe and the United
States.
Third, there are critical improvements
needed in European infrastructure that
would improve mobility and a rapid reinforcement in the event of a crisis in Europe.
Here the United States should continue
to pressure European countries toward
implementing the initiatives already put
forward in the NSIP and the extant Readiness Action Plan. Washington should also
consider earmarking more of the enhanced
EDI allocation for infrastructure projects to
improve the redundancy and resilience in
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the transport networks connecting airports
and seaports of debarkation with pre-positioned stocks across Europe.
Finally, the United States should consider a number of internal changes that
would reduce risk, generate a more robust
deterrence, and enable greater cohesion
among its European partners. There is
considerable benefit in reframing the
intelligence classification process to facilitate greater intelligence sharing and promote a better understanding of the threats
facing NATO. At the same time, Washington should consider stationing additional
forces in Europe until such a time as the

infrastructure could support a more rapid
reinforcement from the continental United
States, while also being prepared to unilaterally deploy forces forward early and
in advance of any decisions made by the
NAC.
Individually, none of these initiatives
can address the myriad of complex difficulties facing the trans-Atlantic alliance.
The powerful, cumulative effect of these
developments taken forward over a broad
front will bolster NATO and EU capability
and help provide the credible deterrence
necessary to face the increasing threats
from Russia and elsewhere.
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